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Editorial

IT is not the way of our leading British theologians to crown or round off their literary labours with the production of a comprehensive "dogmatics." Now, as in the past, the more notable achievements of British theology are in the field of biblical criticism and exegesis, ecclesiastical history, and essays on particular themes or topics. Even if our theologians aimed at the construction of dogmatic systems, it is doubtful whether under present conditions they would succeed, for they are much less prolific than their colleagues on the Continent. This comparative lack of literary productiveness is due, we suspect, not to indolence, but either to a native caution in intellectual commitment or to the ever-increasing absorption of the time of academic theologians in teaching and administrative work.

Thus in theology we have to depend a great deal upon imports, and to be thankful for the enterprise of those who make available in an English translation important works that are produced in foreign countries by both Catholic and Protestant writers. Père de Lubac's *The Drama of Atheistic Humanism*, reviewed in this issue by Dr Oldham, is such a work. So is the first volume of Dr Emil Brunner's Dogmatics—*The Christian Doctrine of God* (Lutterworth Press, 21s.), which has recently appeared in a skilful translation by Dr Olive Wyon. It is expected that there will be two or three volumes to follow. Even so, this will be a much more concise work than Dr Karl Barth's *Dogmatik*, which is still in course of publication. Brunner is more widely read in England than Barth, though Barth may be more often mentioned. This is, we suppose, because Brunner is easier to understand, and because his methods and conclusions are more congenial to our way of thinking. There is more balance and commonsense in them. It does not follow, however, that Brunner is more worthy of study in the Anglo-Saxon world. Just because Barth is more difficult and more shocking, there may be more to be learned by wrestling with his thought, just as in psychology the tendency of Christians to approve or to assimilate Jung rather than Freud is not necessarily a mark of discernment.

Nevertheless, Dr Brunner's Dogmatics will certainly be of great value to English students. He does for us the kind of thing we might be able to do for ourselves, but are not able or inclined to do. The first volume contains twenty-three chapters. Of these, eleven deal with "The Basis and Task of Dogmatics," ten with "The Nature of God and His Attributes," and two with "The Will of God." It has been justly observed that Dr Brunner "always writes with clarity, and he touches nothing which he does not illuminate." More tech-

nical discussions are confined to appendixes. In these Dr Brunner often takes into account the teaching of other continental theologians of the reformed tradition. It would be instructive if he would also relate his thought to some contemporary schools of Roman Catholic theology, and he might even have studied with advantage some Anglican works, such as Mr Burnaby's *Amor Dei* and Professor Hodgson's *The Doctrine of the Trinity*.

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Equally welcome is the translation by Mr J. R. Coates of some of the major articles in Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*. Messrs A. and C. Black have published the first two of these—viz., *Love* (Agape), by G. Quell and E. Stauffer, and *The Church* (Ecclesia), by K. L. Schmidt (6s. each). Others are in preparation, and we hope the publishers will be encouraged to continue the series until all the main treasures of the *Wörterbuch* are available in English. The series is to be known as "Bible Key Words"; it is hardly necessary to point out that these volumes will be indispensable to all serious students of the New Testament who do not read German or who do not have access to a complete set of the *Wörterbuch* itself. In an article in THEOLOGY (February, 1933) on the *Wörterbuch*, soon after its publication in Germany had begun, Sir Edwyn Hoskyns wrote: "Those who read German ought to possess themselves of it. Those who have not this competence must hope that some enterprising publisher will dare to embark upon its translation, in order that it may become available to the generality of English students of the New Testament." If a complete translation is impracticable, Messrs A. and C. Black are to be congratulated for having embarked on the next best thing.

"The specific theme of the Bible," as Hoskyns said, "is the relation between God and man; but the theme is presented to us in written words. The pages lie before us, and we have to decipher their meaning . . . Unless we are prepared to treat words as so many counters upon which we are free to inscribe any meaning we like, there is no escape from a severe and very troublesome linguistic discipline. And yet, is any English New Testament scholar really satisfied with the lexicons which lie on his table? Is he satsified that he has comprehended the meaning of the words which the New Testament writers habitually use? Or . . . are the many parish priests who week by week prepare their sermons on this or that passage from the Scriptures satisfied that the modern commentaries which they consult do really interpret the text as it stands, do really explain the actual words?"

Happiness and Success[1]

Blessed is every one that feareth the Lord; that walketh in his ways. For thou shalt eat the labour of thine hands: happy shalt thou be, and it shall be well with thee.

I. In these two verses of Psalm cxxviii we can distinguish three different notions—or at any rate three different terms; for two or more terms may be used to designate only one notion. Blessedness is one term; happiness is another; success (which is the Latin equivalent of the simple Saxon "it shall be well with thee") is the third. All these three—blessedness, happiness, and success—are linked together by the Psalmist, and assigned to a single origin. That origin is described in a double phrase: the phrase "feareth the Lord," and the phrase "walketh in his ways." If we seek to interpret that double phrase, we may say that to "fear the Lord" is to hold a *religious* faith, and that to "walk in his ways" is to have and to follow a *moral* purpose. The conclusion, therefore, of the whole matter, in the view of the Psalmist, is that blessedness, happiness, and success are the consequences of holding a religious faith and of having and following a moral purpose.

This view of the Psalmist, as we shall presently see in the further course of the argument, is also the view of Aristotle—with the one exception (and it is a great exception) that Aristotle omits the element of religious faith, and substitutes in its place the element of intellectual activity. In brief it is his theory that happiness, and the sister of happiness whom we call "success" (but whom he, like the Psalmist, prefers to call "well-being"), have a double parentage. One parent, he thinks, is the activity of the intellect which produces wisdom—not the wisdom which is the fear of the Lord (here the Greek differs from the Hebrew), but the wisdom which is the apprehension of truth, as truth is discovered by the intellect of man surveying the processes of nature on earth and watching the movements of the heavens above. The other parent, he thinks, is the activity of moral discernment which distinguishes the nature of the true good and chooses the right means for its attainment: the activity which produces goodness. Intellectual wisdom and moral goodness are thus, in his view, the parents of happiness and its sister well-being: without them we are not happy, and in their absence we cannot say, "It is well with us."

II. The view of the Psalmist and the view of Aristotle agree with, and yet differ from, one another; but any difference between them is nothing to the difference which separates them both from our ordinary and current view of the nature of happiness and success. To discover that ordinary and current view we need only go to the dictionary. We may begin by taking the two words "happiness" and "success" separately; but it is wise to say in advance that we shall

[1] The twelfth Sir Alfred Fripp Memorial Lecture, delivered in St Edward's Church, Cambridge, on Thursday, October 13, 1949.

find at the end that in ordinary usage they are practically inseparable and almost indistinguishable. Happiness comes from the word "hap," or chance; and as "hap" or chance may be good or bad, we should expect that happiness might also be a word of two colours, both black and white, and might mean the state of being in "mishap" as well as that of being in "good hap." But man is an inveterate optimist: he is resolved to think that his "hap" will be white, or good, or fortunate; and thus the word "happiness" acquires for him the associations of sunny weather and the Fortunate Isles. He accordingly uses it exclusively as a bright and sunny word; but he still gives it two senses, corresponding indeed to one another, but the one external or objective and the other subjective or internal. In its objective or external sense, happiness is the *material* condition—the condition you can see with your eyes—of a person (I quote from the Oxford Dictionary) "having good hap or fortune; favoured by lot, position or other external circumstance." In its subjective or internal sense, happiness is the *mental* condition —unseen but experienced—of a person (again I quote from the Oxford Dictionary) who is "in the state of pleasurable content of mind which results from success or the attainment of what is considered good." You will notice already, from the words I have quoted, that happiness is bracketed with good fortune or favourable circumstances or (in one word) success. If we now turn to that word "success," and study it also separately, we shall find that it has had a similar history to that of the word "happiness." Success comes from a Latin word which means what happens in the sequel or in succession to something else. Its original sense is thus the termination of an affair. Now as the termination of any affair may be either black or white, either good or bad, we should expect that success would be a word of two colours; and indeed it once *was* such a word, so that you had to add an adjective to show which colour you meant, and you spoke accordingly of "good success" or "ill success." But here again man showed himself an optimist; here again he was resolved to think that the eventual "success" of his own affairs would be white or good; and accordingly success has come to mean (for the last time I quote from the Oxford Dictionary) "the good fortune befalling any one; . . . now often [I beg you to notice these words particularly] with particular reference to the attainment of wealth or position."

I have dwelt on the etymology and definition of these terms—happiness and success—for a very simple reason. The older I grow, the clearer I feel that the definition of terms is the beginning of wisdom. But now that we have defined our terms, as they are ordinarily and currently used—and it is from the ordinary and current usage of terms that thinking must always start—are we satisfied with the result? It would be foolish to say that we are. We must now begin to reflect: we must bring some philosophy, drawn from first principles, to bear on the matter: we must criticize ordinary and current usage in the light of that philosophy. This is what Aristotle did, in his *Ethics* and his *Politics*. There he criticized

the ordinary Greek usage of the terms happiness and success (which was much the same as our ordinary English usage) along lines which, I am inclined to think, it is still profitable to follow. I do not say that he plumbed the ultimate depths. I have already noted that the Greek differed from the Hebrew; and I will add that the Hebrew, as I see the matter, went deeper than the Greek in his conception of human nature and human happiness. But we shall find a preparation for the ultimate depths in the philosophy of the Greek thinker, even if it was imperfect and not founded on the rock.

III. When Aristotle inquired into the nature of happiness he was using a Greek word, *eudaimonia,* which literally means being under a good genius. I have argued elsewhere that our word "felicity" is perhaps the best translation. Happiness is a fortuitous word, which suggests good "hap" or favourable chance: we want a more stable word, which suggests a more stable condition. When, then, and under what conditions, has the soul of man the stability of felicity? That is Aristotle's inquiry; and you will notice that he begins his inquiry with the soul—*not* with the material conditions of good "hap," nor even with the pleasurable content of the mind which results from what is generally called success. To understand the nature of felicity, and the conditions necessary for its existence, we must, in Aristotle's view, begin by a study of the nature of the human soul.

The essence of the human soul, as Aristotle conceives its nature, is found in that part of it which possesses what he calls rational principle, or *logos*: the part peculiar to man, which distinguishes him from the rest of creation: the part whose function and activity is the peculiar function and activity of man. To be a man, to play the part of a man, and therein and thereby to attain the felicity possible for man, is to put in action, and to keep in action, the part of the soul which possesses rational principle. Felicity is therefore activity: the activity of the rational part of the soul. It is not the possession of things: it is not a state of feeling: it is an energy of activity in the highest part of man. Now this activity, as Aristotle proceeds to add, is twofold in its nature, according to the object to which it is directed. It is intellectual or speculative activity, when it is directed to the pursuit of truth. It is moral or practical activity, when it is directed to the attainment of goodness. Both activities are necessary if man is to discharge his function properly and attain his proper stature. Both are necessary if man is to attain the felicity of full and total energy of the whole of his higher self.

Wordsworth, in his *Character of the Happy Warrior,* has a passage which is almost a versification of Aristotle's view, though, as we shall see in a moment, he differs from Aristotle in the order of preference in which he arranges the two activities—the intellectual and the moral. The Happy Warrior is the man

> Who, with a natural instinct to discern
> What *knowledge* can perform, is diligent to learn;
> Abides by this resolve, and stops not there,
> But makes his *moral being* his prime care.

Here "moral being" is the "prime care," and "what knowledge can perform" comes afterwards. But Aristotle, being a philosopher, and engaged along with his pupils in the pursuit of knowledge, puts intellectual or speculative activity first in his order of preference. That may seem to be an intellectualist bias; and there *is* a certain intellectualism in Aristotle, as there was in Greek thinkers generally. But this is not the whole of the matter. There are two other things which have to be said if we are to get his views into a just perspective. The first is that we must not be misled by the Latin word "speculative." The actual Greek word which Aristotle uses is "theoretic," and by "theoretic" activity he means contemplation as well as speculation—or even more than speculation. We may therefore say that his real preference is for contemplative activity; and we need not decry that preference. Many noble natures, even in our own age, sigh for the heights of contemplation and the attainment of the vision. There is something fine, after all, in the passage at the end of the *Ethics* where Aristotle defends the thesis that perfect felicity is a contemplative activity. His argument is that the activity of God, which is blessed above all other activities, must be an activity of contemplation, and that therefore the human activity which is most akin to the divine—the activity of contemplation—must have the greatest felicity.

That is one thing which has to be said. The other is that though he may assign a secondary place, and a lower degree of felicity, to the moral or practical activity of the rational part of the soul, Aristotle is far from decrying the felicity of goodness. On the contrary, when he is dealing particularly with the realm of moral or practical activity, as he is in most of the *Ethics* and the *Politics*—when he is dealing with the problems of the behaviour of man to man, and not with "the things above" and the rapture of their contemplation—he is clear that goodness is felicity, and that the felicity of man is proportionate to his goodness. "We may join in agreeing," he writes in a passage of the *Politics*, "that the amount of felicity which falls to the lot of each individual man is equal to the amount of his goodness and wisdom and the good and wise acts that he does." The greatest compliment which he can pay to the memory of his old master Plato—it comes in a moving poem which he wrote in his honour after his death—is that "he was the only man, or the first, who clearly showed by his own life as well as the arguments of his writings that man attains goodness and felicity together."

IV. We have seen what felicity is, as Aristotle conceives it: a positive energetic activity of the rational part of the soul, both in contemplation and in behaviour, but especially in contemplation. It remains to see what felicity is *not*, and to study its negative aspect as that appears to Aristotle. Being activity, it is not quiescence or acquiescence; it is not a feeling, a reception of enjoyment, a sense of contentment, a state of pleasure and of pleasurable sensation. This is not to say that pleasure is not attached to felicity. On the contrary there is attached to it the very highest of pleasure. But we must

notice that word "attached." Pleasure is not the heart or essence of felicity. Activity, energetic activity—that only, and that in itself—is the very heart and essence. But pleasure, Aristotle says, *supervenes* as a sort of crown upon this activity, just as the bloom of youth does on those who are in the flower of their age. In other words there is a conscious joy which is added and attached to the energy of activity, but which depends for existence upon that energy and is simply its sequel and consequence. The moral is that if you would have pleasure, and the most exquisite of all pleasure, you must first ensue and practise the energetic activity of the rational part of your soul. That is the only gate of entry; and then—but only then—will pleasure that is worth the having be added unto you.

Felicity, then, is not pleasure, though it wears a crown of pleasure, made of the gold of conscious joy in the high exercise of high faculties. Nor, again, does it consist in possessions, or in position, or in the enjoyment of what Aristotle calls the goods external to the soul—the goods, as he also calls them, of fortune. There must always be a difference, he argues in the *Politics*, between being happy, or in a state of felicity, and being fortunate. To be fortunate is a matter of accident and chance, which bring you the goods of fortune external to the soul. To be in felicity is a matter of energy and activity, which bring you the goods, such as temperance and justice and the other virtues, which are internal and inherent in your own soul. But all the same, and none the less, Aristotle admits, and even contends, that felicity demands some measure of endowment, or, as he calls it, "equipment," with the good things of this world. You can hardly exercise the faculty of contemplation, or practise the generous activities of goodness, unless you have some sort of basis—some endowment or equipment of means. Without such a basis your activity will be impeded and imperfect because impeded. The unimpeded energy of the rational part of the soul demands a basis of means—economic means—in a word, possessions. But the means it demands are *means*: they are not ends in themselves. They are instruments for the attainment of felicity: they are not felicity. Being instruments, they are limited in amount by the end and aim they exist to serve. This is a favourite doctrine of Aristotle, that the means or tools or instruments by which you seek to achieve an end are limited in their size and amount by the end which you have in view. A ship must be no bigger than fits the end of sailing. A university must be no larger than fits the end of learning. Wealth must be no greater than fits the end of intellectual and moral energy which is the good and felicity of man. The means to anything is also a *mean*, in its size and amount; and—being a means, and only a means, to the activity of the soul—wealth, too, like every other means, must also be a mean, in *its* size and amount.

V. I cannot but see wisdom in Aristotle's view of the relation of happiness to wealth, just as I also see wisdom in his view of the relation of happiness to pleasure. But there is also wisdom in another part of Aristotle's general view of felicity, to which it is time to turn. Hitherto we have been regarding felicity as consisting

in the exercise and activity of the rational part of the soul, both on its intellectual and on its moral side. There is profit in such a view; but it may be said to be an abstract view. Let us attempt to be concrete, and condescend upon particulars. Let us look at actual life, and its different departments or divisions; let us see how felicity enters into each and where it is most at home. Aristotle distinguishes three departments or divisions of men's actual life. First, there is the department of work or occupation, which he calls *ascholia*, as the Latins called it *negotium*—both words meaning the absence of leisure and the consequent occupation of the mind with necessary business. Work, in his view, is a form of activity which is pursued not for its own sake, as the higher activities are, but for the sake of something beyond itself and outside itself—let us say the gaining of subsistence. Work may be a necessity; but it is not good in itself, and it does not bring felicity. There is something to be said against such a conception of work, and I shall say it presently; but we may leave it, for the moment, as it stands. Next, and secondly, there is the department of recreation or *anapausis*. Recreation, as its name suggests, means rest after work; but it also means, along with that, preparation for new work. In both of its meanings it is thus essentially connected with the notion and fact of work. Like work, it may be necessary; but, again like work, it is not essentially good, and it does not bring felicity, whatever its pleasure may be. Lastly there is the department of leisure, or, as Aristotle calls it, *scholē*. Leisure is the time of cultivation of the mind, in the pursuit of activities for their own sake and not for the sake of anything beyond or outside themselves. What are these activities? We may answer the question in the words of a commentator on Aristotle—"the hearing of noble music and no doubt of noble poetry; intercourse with friends chosen for their worth; and above all the exercise, in company or otherwise, of the speculative faculty." That is leisure, and it is here that felicity is essentially at home.

There is something profound, and yet also imperfect, in this view of the departments of human life and of the place of felicity among those departments. It is true enough that one of the great needs of modern civilization—no less than of ancient, or even more—is a just appreciation of the uses of leisure. "Getting and spending we lay waste our powers" in an iterated round of occupation. Nor is that all. "Standing and staring," too, in reaction from the round and in search of recreation, we make mere amusement a cult and lay waste our powers once more. We thus cross a Puritan idea of the duty and sanctity of work with an Epicurean idea of fleeting the time carelessly in play. There is need for a philosophy of something above both work and play—a philosophy of that true leisure which consists in cultivation of the mind through the use of its highest faculties. Such a philosophy is expounded by Aristotle, and in that sense he has still a message for our times. But it is expounded with an accompaniment which sounds strangely in our ears, and against a background on which our eyes can hardly dwell with satisfaction. We have followed Aristotle a long way in the previous course of

the argument. We have to desert him at the end. Or perhaps we may say that *he* deserts us.

VI. For one thing—not the greatest, and yet it is great enough—he has too low and mean an idea of work and of the relation of work to human felicity. It was easy to fall into that idea in the society in which he lived, over two thousand years ago. Much of its work was done by slaves; and a leisured class, upon that basis, could concentrate an exclusive attention upon the felicity of leisure. Our society is more and more a society in which all work; and we should be miserable indeed if there were no felicity in work. There *is*—indeed, there is a high felicity in a good piece of work well done. "Thou shalt eat the labour of thy hands: happy shalt thou be." Paley, the philosopher of Christ's College in the University of Cambridge, two hundred years ago, was wise in his generation—and also for our generation—when next to "the exercise of the social affections" (which by the way play no great part in Aristotle's scheme, though they are not forgotten) he ranked as a main article of human happiness "the exercise of our faculties, either of body or mind [and you will note that he includes body as well as mind, and manual as well as intellectual activity], in the pursuit of some engaging end." He even says that "engagement is everything"—a phrase I have always liked. My own experience of life squares at every point with what Paley says. To have a job to do, and to do it as well as you can, is a great specific for felicity. When I retired from my chair ten years ago I wondered what was coming to me. I found work to do and I found happiness. The hardest work that I found was when I went out to bombed and devastated Germany to lecture there in the winter as a professor in one of its universities. My work began in misery. It ended, as I found that I could do it and stretch my faculties upon it, in some memorable felicity. "Absent thee from felicity a while." That is sometimes the way to get there—if only you absent yourself to do a piece of work and remember who it is for whom you are doing the work.

That is one ground on which I desert Aristotle—or he deserts me. But there is also another, and a greater. I cannot follow Aristotle in connecting felicity so closely, and by preference, with wisdom of the intellectual order—wisdom which comes from speculative activity—the wisdom of pure understanding. There is indeed, as I have already admitted, and even urged, something to be said for his view. He had himself a mind of pure passionless understanding, richly and rarely endowed with speculative ability; and it may well be that he found his own felicity in exercising and breathing his own particular ability. Nor is that all that can be said in favour of his view. The speculation which he loved, and in which he found felicity, was, as has already been noted, of the order of contemplation. He thought that, as such, it brought men nearest to God, and was, of all human activities, the most akin to God's own activity of contemplating the universe. He even thought that it brought men to something of the nature of a vision of God, as the unmoved Mover of motion whose attractive and urging power draws nature

onward and upward in aspiration to His own being. Speculation, when it reaches this height, attains some measure of communion with God: it becomes a sort of natural theology, and it ends in a doctrine of aspiration which Aristotle can call by the name of love of God.

But the God who is unconsciously loved by all nature, and may be consciously loved by man, is not Himself a God of love. He is loved, but He does not love. He is a being—indeed, He is the end and perfection of being, but He is not a person. The wisdom of speculation, which leads men to the knowledge and even the love of God, brings them only a cold knowledge and a frigid love. Because that is so, it can only bring a cold and frigid felicity. There can be no warmth of felicity without a personal God, who loves even as He is loved, and infinitely more than He is loved. The God of Aristotle, after all, is a god of the understanding, and not the God of all our being, in its depth as well as its height, in its sin and its shame as well as its aspiration. To be in communion with such a God is not to be in joy and felicity—or, at best, it is to be there with only part of our being, imperfect, unsatisfied, restless.

VII. Wisdom is justified of her children. But wisdom alone justifies none of her children. There was a "wisdom" literature among the Hebrews, from the third to the first century before our era, inspired by Greek and, more particularly, by Stoic thought. It is a moving literature, which perhaps reaches its height at the end of the seventh chapter of the Wisdom of Solomon. "Nothing doth God love," says the writer, "save him that dwelleth with wisdom." He celebrates the radiance and the clear shining of wisdom. "Wisdom is radiant, and passeth not away . . . for she is an effulgence from everlasting light, and an unspotted mirror of the working of God." Is it not Greek—this praise of the radiancy and the felicity of wisdom—and does it not remind you of the clear shining of mellow sunshine on a white temple, such as I lately saw at Sunium, in the southernmost tip of Attica, by the side of a glittering sea? But is it not all too clear and more than a little thin? It is good, after reading this praise of the radiancy and felicity of wisdom, to turn to the eighth chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. It is a very different scene. There are dark clouds in the sky, and there is a groaning of creation for deliverance from sin and shame. St Paul knows the ultimate depths, and he is aware of their darkness. But he also knows, and sees, the light which shines through the clouds and the darkness. It is the living spirit of a living and loving God, moving in us, "which have the first fruits of the Spirit," and moving us to faith in His purpose of deliverance, hope for that which we see not but for which we patiently wait, and love that is sure to be answered by love. Here, and here only, is felicity. "We know that to them that love God all things work together for good. . . . We are more than conquerors through him that loved us." It is the activity of loving and being loved which is the last and highest felicity. And that is an activity not only of the rational part of the soul, but of "all thy soul, all thy mind, all thy heart, and all thy strength."

ERNEST BARKER.

The Church of England and Calvin

For a man of sardonic humour and some cynicism few more congenial occupations can be suggested than that he should make himself conversant with Calvin's theology and then read some characteristic Anglican pronouncements upon him. That dictum of Professor Whitney's, for example, that assured us that Calvin, like Luther and Zwingli, "disregarded all previous theology."[1] Or that happy discovery by Professor N. P. Williams that Calvin was inconsistent in his doctrine of original sin[2]—a discovery that throws rather more doubt on Dr Williams' scholarship than on Calvin's consistency. Or, to come up to date, that very curious picture that the authors of *Catholicity* present of the thought of Calvin, which makes one wish they had learned something about the case before donning the black cap. For example: "Man's rational nature, his capacity for culture, for a certain achievement of natural justice and civilization, his very humanity, contain no trace of the lost 'Image of God.' "[3] The qualifications in this country for writing on Calvin seem to be that you shall not have read the *Institutio* more than once, nor take more than two days in reading it, nor believe a word he says in explanation of his doctrines. Fortunately, a few people are bold enough to break the rules—one thinks of J. B. Mozley in his book on predestination, Professor L. Hodgson on the Trinity, and A. L. Lilley's *Reason and Revelation*. And no doubt there are others.

And here, without going into the reasons for this treatment of the Reformer—historical fear and prejudice are probably the roots of it—we may merely remark that it is a pity. We do not wish that Anglicans should become Calvinists—*μὴ γένοιτο*! We sympathize with that Lutheran Catechism which declares that Calvinists have "cn-devilled, through-devilled, and super-devilled hearts."[4] (I would except Calvin myself—but then, he was not a Calvinist.) We only say that Calvin ought to be taken in all seriousness, both because he is one of the great theologians, and also because he raises certain urgent questions which Anglicans cannot afford to by-pass. Sectarianism is most clearly shown by refusal to take account of serious questions.

We need not follow Calvin in all the articles of his theology. Nor, indeed, should we be loyal to him if we did so. He himself, like Luther, has left certain precise and easily applied principles by which his work must stand, and by which, if it does not stand, it is to be corrected. To take the whole *corpus* of his thought, therefore, as classical Calvinism has done, treating it as authoritative in itself, is not only to be guilty of idolatry, but also seriously to misinterpret Calvin, who, although he certainly shows signs in the stress of con-

[1] *The History of the Reformation*, p. 121. 1940 edn., be it noted!
[2] *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*, 1927, p. 431.
[3] *Catholicity*, 1947, p. 23. Cf. *Institutio*, I, xv, 4 and II, ii, 12-21, esp. the end of II, ii, 17.
[4] Quoted in Franz Hildebrandt: *This is the Message*, 1944, p. 114.

troversy of identifying his theology with eternal truth in rather too naïve and direct a manner, nevertheless without doubt wishes his critical and corrective principles to be applied to his own work. The first is his acceptance of Scripture as the only authoritative record and witness of the revelation of God. Joined with this is, not (as has usually been said) justification by faith alone, which, important as it is, is in fact only a corollary of the main point, that Jesus Christ is God for us, and that therefore the Scriptures must be interpreted Christologically and all theology worked out in relation to Christ.

By faith alone means nothing unless it is taken in conjunction with the uniqueness of Christ as the revelation of God and therefore the uniqueness of Christ as the way to the knowledge of God. It is because they do not understand—or, at least, because they will not apply consistently—the principle *by Christ alone*, that Anglo-Catholics, and other Anglicans too, cannot understand what the Reformers meant by *sola fide*. They seem to imagine that "alone" excludes the Sacraments and allows only preaching[1]—though what sort of special action of God they think that Calvin saw in preaching and not at the same time in the Sacraments is far from clear. May we here and now assure them that "alone" excludes the works of men in favour of the work of God in Jesus Christ; and that Calvin believed that this work for us becomes work in us, not in the one-sided and un-Trinitarian way in which they say, by means of the Sacraments only, but by means of the Word and the Sacraments equally. *By faith alone* means: only in Christ, who comes to us in Word and in Sacraments, do we receive forgiveness and eternal life, with all those blessings that are "in Christ." If you are going to say *by Christ alone* (having in mind the Christ of the Scriptures) you cannot escape saying also *by faith alone* without inconsistency. And a refusal to say *by Christ alone* is to proclaim oneself double-minded, at variance with the single-mindedness of the New Testament.

We may therefore say that the essential question which Calvin puts to the Church of England consists in his attitude of single-mindedness or one-sidedness—an attitude frequently noticed and deprecated by Anglicans. Their perception in this matter is perfectly accurate, if in certain circumstances a trifle one-sided. Calvin is passionately one-sided. He stands on the side to which he has been called, the side of Jesus Christ. He obeys the exhortation of Ignatius to the Romans: "Be ye deaf therefore, when any man speaketh to you apart from Jesus Christ." He can stand in no other place than where Luther is, who asserts: "I, Dr Luther, will know of none other God but Him alone who hung on the Cross; Jesus Christ, the Son of God and of the Virgin Mary."

It is this one-sidedness, this keeping himself only unto Christ, this determination to know nothing but Christ, worked out, in submission to the witness of the Scriptures, in a thorough-going and

[1] *Catholicity* (1947), p. 22 and n. 1.

consistent manner, that explains Calvin's theology and provides the unity apparent in his various works. The *Institutio*, the Commentaries, and the Sermons have but this one theme of Jesus Christ as the Son of God and our Redeemer.

But this is going a little too far. Calvin was consistent and thorough-going, but not so consistent as he should have been, and so we find ugly blemishes in his work. They may, I think, be explained on the hypothesis that he sometimes forsook his main principle in favour of a subsidiary principle. For example, in the first five chapters of the *Institutio* he adheres faithfully to his principle of *Scriptura sola*, and what is more, interprets the Creation in terms of faith; but he fails to expound it in a satisfactory relation to Christ. Hence it has been possible for E. Brunner to claim that Calvin was a "natural theologian," and for A. Lecerf to spin out these five chapters (while the angels wept) into an imposing *Introduction to Reformed Dogmatics*. But for Calvin, Christ was the introduction, the gateway, to all knowledge of God. In this matter it certainly seems as if we should correct Calvin misinformed by Calvin better-informed. Again, in his treatment of predestination, Calvin takes over the Augustinian and Thomist doctrine, not indeed uncritically, but regarding it as a valuable part of his principle of "by grace alone." Moreover, he makes an effort to relate it to Christ, but does not carry this through to a consistent conclusion, but allows the doctrine to remain, for all its importance in his theology, as a sort of dead end, leading us nowhere. These are blemishes, and there are no doubt others. They warn us that nothing is easier than to slip away from good theological intentions. Yet, in the main, Calvin was remarkably loyal to his principles. And where he fails, he has left us the means of revising him. He sets burglar-alarms against himself as well as against others.

Calvin is unashamedly one-sided. It is, however, precisely this one-sidedness which proves a scandal to Anglican theologians, who have often shown themselves far too ready to follow every pretty theological face instead of remaining faithful to Christ. The impression seems to prevail that two-sidedness, quickly corrected into the *via media* (O blessèd word Mesopotamia!) constitutes catholicity, while one-sidedness is the mark of the sect. But what is it that makes theology *Christian* theology? Hardly the fact that it is written within the sphere of the Church! Nor that it is in general agreement with the Creeds or "New Testament theology." It is Christian or pagan according to its actual attitude to Christ, just as in our lives we are Christian or not according to our attitude to Him. For this reason, when we compare Calvin with a great deal of Anglican theology (of all schools), it seems to me that it is Calvin who emerges as the Christian and Catholic theologian. Where in contemporary Anglican theology is this concern for the one thing necessary—Christ? It is time we stopped despising the Reformers and listened carefully to what they have to say to us. We should not allow our historical prejudices or our insular pride to prevent us learning from them. We have gone down from Jerusalem to Jericho and

fallen among thieves. Neither the priest nor the Levite has helped us. The Samaritan may prove helpful.

Calvin's greatness as a theologian and as a statesman admits no question. That German may well be right who called him the greatest man in the Church since St Paul. But we are not very interested in his greatness. We are not much interested that the final edition of the *Institutio* stands out majestically as one of the half-dozen greatest works of Christian theology, nor that out of chaos he built a Church, nor that he was one of the greatest exegetes and expositors of the Church in any age. Let his greatness lie with him in his unknown grave. But in this we are interested, that by this man is sounded clearly and urgently the authentic witness to Jesus Christ. He was fond of saying that Christ must preside in the pulpit. In Calvin's theology, with all its imperfections, Christ presides. Herein lies the question that Calvin sets before us Anglicans.

T. H. L. Parker.

Some Notes on Lancelot Andrewes

Lancelot Andrewes was born in 1555 in the parish of All-Hallows, Barking. In the same year Latimer and Ridley were burned, and Archbishop Cranmer suffered the same fate in 1556. The Reformation episcopate was extinct, and the stage was set for a new act in the drama of the Church of England.

Under Edward VI the chief danger which beset the Church was the Protestantism of Geneva; under Mary, the Catholicism of Rome. These dangers were outspoken, obvious, violent: and the Church survived them. But with the accession of Elizabeth came a more subtle peril. Was that divinity which hedged a king to obscure the divine character of the Church? And what is the Church? an autonomous body, part of the Church Catholic? or a department of the State?

These were among the questions which Lancelot Andrewes was born to answer. The seventy-one years of his life cover the most momentous period in the history of the English Church.

After a schooling at the newly founded Merchant Taylors', Andrewes proceeded, in 1571, to Pembroke Hall, Cambridge, with a Greek scholarship. The Puritan controversy had reached its climax. Thomas Cartwright, fellow of Trinity and Lady Margaret professor of divinity, an ardent Calvinist, had recently been deprived of his offices and had retired to Geneva. Whitgift, master of Trinity and vice-chancellor, had triumphed; but it was only a lull in the storm. Puritanism was still a very active force in the University. Indeed, Whitgift himself, as was to be shown when he became Archbishop, was of Calvinistic sympathies, and his repression of Cartwright had been in the interests of public order rather than of doctrinal orthodoxy.

In 1575 Andrewes took his B.A. degree, and a year later was elected to a fellowship. In 1578 he proceeded M.A. and was ap-

pointed "catechist" of his college. The event marks the beginning of a new school of religious thought in Cambridge—almost, one might say, in the Church of England. Appealing to the authority of the Fathers, acknowledging the teaching of the medieval doctors, it takes its stand on the conception of an historic church which is one with the Apostolic community in doctrine and order. It has proved to be the real and permanent *ethos* of the Church of England.

Andrewes' duty as catechist was to give a series of lectures on theology: a series published, in an imperfect form, after his death. It is in these lectures that his talent for order, simplicity, and memorableness was first apparent. "The dutie of the Catechist," he says, "is to make his Doctrine easie to enter; by giving it an edge and perspicuitie of method." He did not forget the youthfulness of his flock at Pembroke:

> Hee chargeth *Peter* to feed not onely his sheepe but his Lambes; and his Lambes first for the increase of the whole flocke. That our nature being then quicke and prone to evill, may be turned to good. If children can say *Bald pate* to *Elisha*, why should they not say *Hosanna* to *Christ*?

Andrewes insists, as Herbert was to do later, that the hard points of theology are not the most important ones. This, of course, was a direct hit at the Calvinists with their perpetual discourses of election and reprobation. And we must search for more knowledge:

> We must continually proceed, and still seeke for more and more knowledge: for, as in some places of the Scripture the Lambe may wade, so in others the Elephant may swim; and we must search both.

This stressing of the search for knowledge is another note that was beginning to make itself heard in Anglican theology. The light of reason, an idea which was to become so important for the Cambridge Platonists, is the basis of Hooker's great Apology; and it is prominent in Andrewes:

> The builders of our age digge not deepe enough; they digge not to the Rocke: Now to digge till we come to the Rocke that we may build surely thereupon, is after this manner. If any ground of Religion be set, wee must seeke whether the ground be true.

It is in *The Patterne of Catechistical Doctrine*, as these lectures came to be called, that Andrewes employs the phrase, *Ordo mater pacis*, which expresses the guiding principle of his life. He had a strong feeling for order within the Church; and for him the word became inevitably identified with its ecclesiastical meaning—with the Apostolical succession, with continuity, and with the hierarchy. The battles of the near future were to be fought around the standard of episcopacy.

In 1580 Andrewes was ordained deacon, and in the succeeding year, priest. In 1586 he was appointed chaplain to Whitgift, then Archbishop of Canterbury; vicar of St Giles', Cripplegate, in 1588; prebendary of Southwell in 1589, and a little later of St Paul's. In the same year he proceeded D.D. and was elected to the Mastership of Pembroke. His period of office, from 1589 to 1605, was marked by

the increasing prosperity of his college, and by a vigorous championing of the divine right of episcopacy.

Andrewes had been appointed one of Queen Elizabeth's chaplains in 1586, and in 1589 he preached his first sermon before her at Whitehall. It was the beginning of a long series of court sermons which continued after the Queen's death right through the reign of James. Andrewes' chief fame is as a preacher, and it is only by a careful study of the sermons (themselves masterpieces of English prose) that we can arrive at any true conception of the influence which Andrewes wielded over the Church of his day. Unlike the sermons of Donne, they seek to move by reason rather than by rhetoric. They are not easily quotable, by virtue of their complex and integrated structure, but they are intensely memorable.

In 1601 Andrewes became Dean of Westminster. He took upon himself the duty of instructing the boys of Westminster school in Greek and Hebrew, and gained both their love and respect. Hacket, later Bishop of Lichfield, was a schoolboy under him, and recounted in later life

> How strict that excellent man was to charge our masters that they should give us lessons out of none but the most classical authors. . . . That he never walked to Cheswick without a brace of this young fry, and in that wayfaring leisure had a singular dexterity to fill these narrow vessels with a funnel.

Among his pupils was George Herbert—later to become, at Cambridge, Andrewes' close friend and disciple.

When James came to the throne in 1603 a new period in Andrewes' career began. Not only did he take part in the Hampton Court conference of January, 1604, and formed one of the Cambridge group of translators of the Authorized Version which was a direct result of the Conference, but he also felt able at last to accept a bishopric. He was elevated to the see of Chichester in 1605. Two days after his consecration the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot burst upon a horrified Britain, and brought the Roman controversy once more to the fore. Savage penal legislation followed. An Oath of Allegiance, denying that monarchs excommunicated by the Pope might be deposed or assassinated, was imposed. Rome immediately issued two *breves* condemning the Oath. James replied in his *Triplici nodo triplex cuneus*; Cardinal Bellarmine counter-attacked with *Responsio Matthæi Torti*. The pamphlet war was now well under way. But James found the labour of writing tedious; and contenting himself with a short pamphlet, called upon Andrewes to demolish the Cardinal. It was a formidable and uncongenial task. Andrewes lacked the controversial spirit, and he was already overwhelmed with pastoral cares and court duties. But he was undoubtedly the only man in England with a fund of theological learning which could compare with Bellarmine's. In 1609, the year of his translation to the see of Ely, he completed and published the *Tortura Torti*, and a year later the *Responsio ad Apologiam Cardinalis Bellarmini*. The latter treatise is a complete and reasoned exposition of the English Church's place in the Church Catholic.

But in turning from Andrewes the controversialist to Andrewes the friend and spiritual guide we shall see him in a truer light, and the school of devotional thought which he formed with George Herbert and Nicholas Ferrar is his most lasting contribution to the life of the English Church. Herbert dated the turning point in his life from their meeting at Cambridge, when Andrewes accompanied James on one of his visits to the University. And Herbert's poetry is the supreme artistic expression of those principles of faith and order which ruled the bishop's teaching. If Andrewes may be considered the Aquinas, Herbert is the Dante of the Anglican Church. The scale is immeasurably smaller, but the comparison is not fantastic. Andrewes was the chief English theologian of his day. He was, as his *Preces Privatæ* demonstrated, mystic as well as a doctor of the Church. And Herbert pursued, in the circuit of his own mind, a progress from despair through purgation to illumination which is a smaller image of the *Commedia.*

Andrewes occupied the see of Ely until 1618, when he was translated to Winchester, where he remained until his death in 1626. These closing years of his life were comparatively quiet, though two notorious events must be noted. In 1613 the Essex divorce suit shook the conscience of the Church. It is unnecessary to go into its unsavoury ramifications. Certain historians have pointed to Andrewes' attitude in voting for the divorce as a stain on his character, but we do not know enough about Andrewes' motives to pass judgment. Abbot, then Archbishop of Canterbury—an office which it was supposed would have fallen to Andrewes after Bancroft's death—resolutely opposed the king's wishes and voted against the divorce. Eight years later, by a strange turn of fate, Abbot found himself arraigned for ecclesiastical irregularity before a commission of which Andrewes was a member. While hunting deer in Lord Zouch's park the Archbishop had accidentally struck and killed a gamekeeper. In canon law, he became, as a homicide, "irregular, and suspended from all ecclesiastical functions until restored by some ecclesiastical superior."[1] As there was no ecclesiastical superior to whom appeal could be made, the problem was a delicate one. A commission of six bishops and four laymen was appointed, including Andrewes, who agreed that the Primate might be restored by the royal authority. It is noteworthy that Andrewes, who differed in almost every point of Church doctrine from the Puritan Abbot, was his greatest champion in the commission's deliberations.

The case of Archbishop Abbot is important for the light it throws on Andrewes' general attitude. The reason he gave for his decision:

> Brethren, be not too busy to condemn any for uncanonicals according to the strictness thereof, lest we render ourselves in the same condition. Besides, we all know *canones qui dicunt lapsos post actam pœnitentiam ad clericatum non esse restituendos, de rigore loquuntur disciplinæ, non injiciunt desperationem indulgentiæ,*

typifies the circumspection of his outlook, the way he applies to a

[1] R. L. Ottley, *Lancelot Andrewes.* This remains the best introduction to a study of Andrewes.

question of interpretation deeper considerations than the purely legal. His mind is the antithesis of the official. He is capable of ranging a body of considerations in an order of greater and lesser importance; and this principle he applies to the dogmas of faith as well as to practical problems. Certain points—the Incarnation, the Resurrection, the Atonement—are irreducible; so are the decisions of the general councils. But on the outskirts of these primary truths are others which are vaguer in outline. God did not take away from us the exercise of reason even in the sphere of revelation, and it is good that we should arrive at certain convictions by our own efforts and experience—by study, meditation, and prayer. Even episcopacy, divinely ordained as it is, is not of the first order of doctrinal importance:

> It follows not, if our regimen be of divine right, that therefore there is no salvation without it, or that a church cannot stand. He must be blind who does not see churches standing without it. He must be made of iron who refuses them salvation. We are not of iron mould,

he asserts in a letter to Du Moulin.

The doctrine of the Incarnation is at the centre of Andrewes' teaching. "There is no religion but this that teacheth to the heart," he says in the *Pattern of Catechistical Doctrine*. During all the long years of his ministry, he tells us, he never once preached on the subject of predestination, election, and reprobation. One has only to compare, not simply the sermons of the great Puritan divines, but those of Donne, to appreciate the uniqueness of this. Andrewes never seeks to terrify his hearers into goodness.

If one were to attempt a summary of Andrewes' structure of beliefs, it would be found that with him the drama of the Christian faith takes a more than usually dramatic form. Like Herbert, he sees the scheme of things as a struggle between the great figures of Sin and Love for the soul of man. He loves to personify, to turn Sin and Love, Mercy and Truth, Peace and Righteousness (elaborating a hint from the eighty-fifth Psalm) into the *dramatis personæ* of a mystery play. In his literary tendencies, as in the spirit of his theology, Andrewes is our last medieval writer.

The first act of the drama is the Fall. Andrewes, obeying his own precept to settle the foundations first, has a detailed discussion of the nature of sin. We are reminded that he was an accomplished casuist, and did much to maintain the tradition of auricular confession in the English Church. His analysis is profound and moving:

> And now, we may be at our choise, whither we will conceive, of sinne, as of some outward soile, in the soule; And then, the *purging* of it, to be *per viam balnei*, needs a *bath*, with some cleansing ingredients, as the Prophet speakes, of the herb *Borith*: And, this way *purged* He us; made a bath of the *water* that came out of His *side*, to that end opened, that from thence might flow a *fountaine for sinne and for vncleannesse* (Zach. xiii, 1). *Water*, and mixed with His *blood*; as forcible, to take out the steines of the soule, as any herb *Borith* in the world, to take away the soile of the skinne.
>
> Or, whither we will conceive of sinne, as of some inward pestilent humour, in the soule and conscience, casting us into perill of mortall (or rather, immortall) death: Then, the purging of us, to be by way of some Electuarie,

> or *Potion*: (And so, He *purgeth* our sinnes, too.) To that end He made an Electuarie of his owne *bodie*, (*Take, eate it*) and tempered a *cup* with His owne blood, (*Drink ye all of it*) which, by the operation of His eternall *Spirit* in it, is able effectually to *purge the conscience from dead works* (or actuall sinnes) and from the deadly effect of them: No balsame, or medicine, in the world, like it.[1]

This passage is sufficient to demonstrate, among other things, the closely interwoven pattern of Andrewes' thought. Logical as his preaching is, he never attempts to treat absolutely of any one point of his faith without constant reference to all the other points which are dependent upon it. Hence the organic unity of his sermons.

The second act of the drama is the Incarnation. In the first act Sin has, for the moment, triumphed; now Love comes out to give battle:

> Of which *Love* the *Apostle* when he speaketh, he setteth it out with *height* and *depth, length* and *bredth*, (the *foure dimensions* of the *Crosse*) to put us in mind (say the *ancient Writers*) that, upon the extent of the *tree*, was the most exact *Love*, with all the *dimensions* in this kind, represented, that ever was.[2]

The Incarnation is the first victorious battle in the war between Sin and Love. It is a history, and it is a mystery:

> *The manifestation of God in the flesh*, the *Evangelists* set downe, by way of a *Historie*: The Apostle goeth further, and findeth a deepe *Mysterie* in it; and for a *Mysterie*, commends it unto us. Now, there is difference betweene these two; Many: This, for one; that a man may heare a *Storie*, and never *wash his hands*; but, a *Mysterie* requireth both the hands and heart to be clean, that shall deale with it.[3]

It is this mystery which Andrewes seeks not to expound, but to illustrate, with all the intellectual and poetic skill at his command. Now it is Christ as the mighty Pan that he celebrates (*Nativity Sermon* XVI); now the eternal generation of the Son before all worlds is likened to a word unspoken:

> When we thinke a *word* in our thought, and speake it there, within, to our selves (as it were in silence) and never utter it: this (if you marke it well) is a kind of *conceiving* or *generation*: the mind, within, of it selfe *ingendring* a *word*, while (yet) it is but in motion, kept in, and known to none, but to our selves. And such was the mind of His Father before all worlds. . . . Now, as the word, yet within us in our thought, when time comes that we will utter it, doth take to it selfe an *aierie* body (our breath by the vocall instruments being framed into a voice) and becometh audible to the outward sense. . . . Right so, the æternall WORD *of* GOD.[4]

The point that I would make, and which these quotations emphasize, is the deep inwardness of Andrewes' faith. If one may adapt a phrase of Baxter's about George Herbert: "He speaks of God like a man that really believeth in God, and whose business in the world

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[1] *Of the Nativity*, VII. Another key passage on the nature of sin, the nearest Andrewes ever comes to sustained rhetoric, occurs in Sermon V *Of the Nativity*. Sermon III *Of Repentance and Fasting* gives a detailed account of the three stages of sin: the *Fall*, the *Relapse*, and the *Wallow*. Donne may have had this in mind when writing his *Hymn to God the Father*.

[2] Sermon III *Of the Passion*.

[3] Sermon III *Of the Nativity*.

[4] Sermon XVII *Of the Nativity*.

is most with God: heart-work and heaven-work make up his book." Andrewes describes the City of God as an inhabitant of that City; he can be simple without meanness, conversational without triviality. There is a note of naïve surprise and wonder in his view of the Incarnation, a simplicity of that childlike quality which is the portion of the saints:

> An we (vnworthy, wretched *men* that we are,) above and before the *Angells*, the *Cherubim*, the *Seraphim*, and all the *Principalities*, and *Thrones*, in this dignitie. This being beyond the rules and reach of all reason, is surely matter of astonishment.[1]

Or, as he sums the matter up in one imperishable phrase: "We are dearer to Him, then Himselfe."[2]

The third and last act in the great drama is the Passion. *Verus amor non sumit vires de spe.* This is the supreme test of that Love which, in the words he so often quotes from St Bernard, receives no strength from hope. In three magnificent sermons which plumb the depths of the meaning of sacrifice, Andrewes drives home the contrast between human love and divine. These sermons *Of the Passion* vie with those *Of the Nativity* in subtlety of thought and flexibility of language:

> *Leo* it is, that first sayd it, (and all Antiquitie allow of it,) *Non solvit unionem, sed subtraxit visionem.* The *union* was not *dissolved*; True, but the beames, the *influence* was *restrained*; and, for any comfort from thence his Soule was, euen as a scorched earth-ground, without so much as any drop of dew of divine comfort: as a *naked tree*, no *fruit* to refresh him within, no *leafe* to give him shadow without: The power of darknesse let loose to afflict him: The influence of comfort, restrained to relieve him.[3]

Here, as everywhere in the Sermons, quotation cannot do justice to the original. The sustained image of which this is only a part should be studied in detail.

The extremely personal nature of Andrewes' religion comes out most clearly in these *Sermons Of the Passion.* They abound in realistic descriptions. What is real to himself Andrewes strives, with every device of familiar allusion, to make real and affecting to his hearers. But his effects can never justly be called rhetorical:

> No manner violence offered him in body; no man touching him, or being neer him; in a cold night (for they were faine to have a *fire* within dores) lying abroad in the aire, and upon the cold earth, to be all of a *sweat*, and that *sweat* to be *Blood*.[4]

In all his writings, Andrewes displays one supreme gift: the power of applying, and teaching others how to apply, the great truths of religion to the practical needs of the good life. Mysteries though they are, the dogmas of the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the Resurrection may be harnessed, as it were, to the service of the sinner's struggle for holiness. Again and again he traces the course

[1] Sermon I *Of the Nativity.*
[2] Sermon IX *Of the Nativity.*
[3] Sermon II *Of the Passion.*
[4] Sermon II *Of the Passion.*

of the way of life: *purgare, illuminare, perficere*[1]—purgation, illumination, perfection—and points to the sources of grace. And he never forgets, in the midst of his most abstruse exegeses, the plight of sinners and the need to help them.

BERNARD BLACKSTONE.

The Parson Leaving

GEORGE HERBERT in his *Country Parson* did not see the need of a chapter headed "The Parson Leaving." In his spacious days parsons did not as a rule change their cure very often; it is only in the present century that restlessness has spread among the clergy. The parish priest of to-day must to some people appear to be the world's greatest pessimist, for his present parish is always unique—no other parish is so difficult or has so many problems—but he is in fact the world's greatest optimist, for he is always ready to move to another parish, where with the grace of God he expects to overcome all difficulties. Nor does he seem to tire of trying again. It is impossible to look back to the days when parsons held incumbencies for fifty years or so without a feeling of admiration for their endurance and tenacity.

Yet there is something to be said for reasonable changes in this age of rush and bustle. The old ideal of marrying those the priest baptized and later baptizing and marrying their children was good when things were stable. The priest who stays long to-day finds a stream of people passing him by in ever-changing removals. The feverishness of the age has its influence on the clergy. Moreover, a change brings a little respite for a few months just before and just after the change; and a new parish without question brings encouragement and inspiration.

Rightly or wrongly there is now a continual change of incumbents in most parishes, with all the possibilities of irritations between successors and predecessors. Be that as it may, it should be noticed that Pastoralia theory is almost dumb on the art of clerical departure. Some books do give attention to the way an incumbent should come into his parish and begin his spiritual work; none appears to risk advice on the way to make a graceful exit. Yet surely the latter is as necessary as the former. A parson owes it to himself to make an auspicious beginning or his ministry may thereafter be frustrated; but he owes it to his successor to make a becoming ending, and thereby is the sincerity of his ministry tested.

What then are the cardinal virtues of the departing parson? First a forward look and not a backward glance. His new flock must be more to him than his erstwhile sheep, and the less he visits his old pastures the better. He need not fear that the next incumbent will not know how to bury the dead.

Next, like a wild duck, he leaves clean water and not a muddy pool behind him. When the English bishops were asked to leave the Nippon Sei Ko Kwai in the days before the war, a wise old Chris-

[1] Sermon V *Of the Nativity.*

tian referred to a Japanese proverb which expressed just that idea. Whatever the reason for departure, the least said soonest mended.

Further, he should leave a financial clean sheet. Happy is he if no accounts have been thrust upon him, for then he will have none to pass on. But the average parson has two or three accounts to keep, which, if he is wise, he will leave up to date, balanced, correctly audited, with cheque-books and other bank material ready for the sequestrators. There should be no doubts arising from the finances in which he has been involved.

Finally, he will leave behind him all he can by way of information both to save his successor's time and to help him in his work. How many letters might be saved the Church Commissioners, the Pensions' Board, and the Diocesan Authorities, if a corpus of information passed like a deposit of faith from incumbent to incumbent in true succession. How much easier would it be for patrons if it were known that such information existed. How much easier, too, for the sequestrators and churchwardens to carry on during the interregnum if they had such a guide. Lay officials are often in ignorance about many details of the incumbent's work, and find it difficult to give full information to a new parson when he comes.

The registrar of an important diocese has said that it would be worth while to summarize the kind of information a priest should leave behind him, and this is an attempt:

A. There is that which affects the incumbent personally, and the departing parson can only supply the true facts about:

(1) *The Stipend.* For this he should give the details of the sources and amounts from each with the time of payments; where amounts vary——*e.g.*, fees—a few years' records could be given; local peculiarities specially should be given; the notes should state the outgoings and expenses of the benefice, and an account of the office expenses paid by the parish.

(2) *The Vicarage.* Here the information should include the rateable value, gross and net, and schedule A; water rate, gas and electric rates; dilapidations rate, and date of last survey; the list of fixtures, details of hired appliances if any; also the size of floors and windows of each room—usually each successive victim must measure them all.

(3) *The Glebe Lands.* Their location, character and acreage; tenants' names and addresses and rents paid; schedule A assessments and district office; list of dues, tithe, drainage rate and agents' fees.

(4) *General.* There are usually some other personal matters concerning lands, buildings, or other property under the incumbent's control, for which information is needed as in (3) above.

B. Information is also necessary about various parochial affairs, first that of a more permanent nature.

(1) Contents of the church safe. List of registers with dates; deeds, faculties, licences, etc.

(2) List of deeds not in possession of the church for property owned by the church—*e.g.*, those with the Board of Finance.

(3) List of insurance policies (which should be in a safe). Details of property insurances, with which office, what value, what premium, and dates due.

(4) Halls and schools. Details of seating capacity, licences held from Local Authority, Performing Rights Society agreements. List of fixtures. Standing orders of the P.C.C. for use of the halls.

(5) Poster boards and notice boards. Details of sizes.
(6) Historical notes. Principal dates. List of incumbents, etc. Anniversaries observed and when.
(7) Parish magazine. Name and address of printer and contract in operation; details of advertisements and charges; details of insets.

C. Other information of a less permanent character is also needed, but which should be kept up to date from year to year.
(1) List of officials with addresses; membership of P.C.C., Sunday school organization, giving teachers and leaders.
(2) Days each week allocated to different organizations.
(3) Annual statistics. This might cover anything of interest; numbers of communicants, baptims, magazine circulation, etc. Such information is exceedingly useful for the annual returns to the Central Board of Finance.
(4) The parson ought to leave behind a list of the sick brought up to date to the day of his departure. Such a list is more useful if it includes an indication about communicants among them.

There are various methods which can be adopted for filing or noting the information listed above, but many parsons are shy of systems such as Mastrom or Unicard. One simple method is a common notebook (which need only be indexed if the information really is lengthy) which gives a page or two to various headings. The information under sections A and B above certainly can be put in small compass; the facts in section C are better provided in a loose leaf book which requires revision from time to time.

There lies the difficulty. At once it is seen that departure cannot be accomplished gracefully on the spur of the moment. Information should be collected during the incumbency, and if it is kept up to date, then departure can be made with a clear conscience and without hurried stock-taking. A change of incumbents would not cause very much upheaval in a parish where such methods were followed.

Obviously a record of this kind would be a modern terrier, something rather more than an inventory of church furniture. An inspection of ancient terriers would show that often they listed the endowment, gave a table of fees, and sometimes prescribed the remuneration of the parish clerk, often in kind. This was a valuable record. The possession of a terrier has sometimes in the past saved encroachment upon glebe boundaries.

Something similar is needed to-day, and this should include the information required by sections A and B at least. Perhaps the Church Commissioners or the Central Board of Finance could provide a schedule in the form of a notebook, so that each parish could have a standard record. But it must be simple so that any parson that comes to the parish can use it; otherwise it will be used only by the filing fiends.

C. R. Forder.

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CORRESPONDENCE

RES SIGNIFICATA

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

It is a cause of thankfulness that attention is now directed in Eucharistic theology to the *thing done* rather than to the *thing used*. This change has been the means of reconciliation of past conflicts of thought. However, the question of the *thing used* is still with us and requires attention from time to time—for example, when the use of and honour due to the Reserved Sacrament are discussed. Is reconciliation possible here?

There have been those who have attempted this by suggesting the terms "transvaluation" and "convaluation" (W. Temple, *Christus Veritas*, p. 248). But the only permanent legacy of this has been its use to justify the actions of those who reserve the Blessed Sacrament without paying it honour. The philosophy has not commended itself widely.

To-day we meet on all sides the word "relationship," or in other spheres of thought "relativity." Is a correction to be found in this word of what was lacking in the term "value"? Would it be a correct proposition to state "A thing is the totality of its relationships"? In order not to widen the discussion to that of *absolute reality* and *ontological significance* we can take for our illustration a humanly contrived *thing*—a book. Its relationships can be divided into the original, the actual, and the potential, to correspond with its past, present, and future. An analysis of the meaning of the time series will prevent our laying emphasis on any *one* of these relationships to the exclusion of the others, though we shall see that the original is primary and determinant. For the present is past as soon as it is conceived in the word "now"; the future is only potential and lacks even the degree of reality of the present. The past exists in memory, imagination, and in its effects. Therefore of the three relationships, the past or original has the greater degree of reality, though *the thing* is not truly itself without all three.

We can now consider our illustration—a book. Actually and present it is paper and ink, and this is its relationship to all other *things*, as they would appear in a scientist's test tube. But this paper and ink are in a certain arrangement or *order*. It is this *order* that determines their existence as *book* and not only as *paper and ink*. This order derives from the act of the author, who first constituted the arrangement and which has been reproduced by publisher and printer. It is this original act, the original relationship, which determines what *the thing* is—*i.e., book*. It constitutes its essence.

But in addition there must be an actual relationship—*i.e*, there must be copies of the book in existence and a potential relationship —*i.e.*, a potential reader. The original act would not have constituted *book* had it been a meaningless scribble.

On the other hand, it is not necessary for this potential relationship to be actual. For instance, a book could be buried and the understanding of its language lost. It would not cease to be book. When it was discovered and its language deciphered, it would be found to be what it had been all the time—*i.e.*, book. The discovery does not constitute or reconstitute it a book. *The potiential use of the book does not have to be actual for it to remain still a book.*

The application of this reasoning to the theology of the Blessed Sacrament is apparent. The bread and wine are like the paper and ink, necessary for the actual, present relationship to all other *things*. But Christ's act and command at the institution and the Church's obedience, reproducing His arrangement or *order*, bring them into a relationship to Him and those who use them that constitute them the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ. This *res significata*, like the meaning of the language in the book, is constituted by the original act. For its total reality it needs potential communicants and a present actual relationship of bread and wine. But the potential need not be the actual for the Blessed Sacrament to exist.

A thing, it is true, is only *effective* if the potential is the actual. A book needs a reader in order to be effective—and an intelligent one—the more so, the more effective. So the Sacrament needs a faithful communicant to be effective—the more faithful, the more effective. But this effectiveness does not affect the *res significata*.

I would be grateful, Sir, if you would submit this argument to the scrutiny of philosophers and theologians. If it is valid, it reveals the shortcomings of the value philosophy, which laid undue weight upon the actual and potential, treating them as primary. If this error is admitted, it would open the way to a more fruitful discussion of the practical problems involved.

Yours faithfully,

E. P. Field.

Lyng Rectory,
Norwich.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Drama of Atheistic Humanism. By Henri de Lubac, S.J. Sheed and Ward. 15s.

It would be difficult to name a book that goes more directly and deeply to the heart of the contemporary crisis in the life of mankind than this work of Père de Lubac. The title is aptly chosen, for there is no greater drama than man's wrestling with, or it may be forgetting or denying, the ultimate question of his existence. The dramatic effect is heightened by the presentation of the issues in the attitudes of four of the chief protagonists in the modern drama—

Ludwig Feuerbach (who in this matter was the father of Karl Marx), Friedrich Nietzsche, Auguste Comte, and Fedor Dostoevsky. Père de Lubac's mastery of his material and the brilliance of his exposition are worthy of the greatness of his theme.

The year 1842 saw both the completion of Comte's momumental *Cours de philosophie positive* and the publication of Feuerbach's *Das Wesen des Christentums*. During the century that has elapsed since then, under the influence of these thinkers, re-enforced by Marx and Nietzsche, we have witnessed, Père de Lubac contends, beneath all the surface currents of contemporary thought a deep undercurrent, or rather an immense *drift*, of men's minds from their Christian past and from belief in God. Modern atheism goes deeper than speculative doubts about God's existence. It is not so much atheistic as anti-theistic. The thinkers who have been mentioned were all convinced that faith in God was disappearing for ever. When Nietzsche proclaimed that God was dead, he knew that it was the end of an epoch. Modern atheism is "positive, organic, constructive." It is a deliberate attempt on the part of man to accept unreservedly all the consequences of the rejection of God and take on his own shoulders the whole responsibility for the direction of the world.

It is a strange and remarkable revulsion of sentiment, as Père de Lubac reminds us, that the Christian idea of the sublimity of man's vocation in his relation to a loving God, which came to the ancient world as an immense deliverance, freeing men from subjection to blind hazard and fate, and lifting them on a new wave of hope, is felt to-day to be a yoke, taking from man a greatness which is properly his own. What we have to reckon with is a fundamental change of temper. The essential thing, according to Comte, is not to prove or disprove the existence of God, but a state of mind in which the question is no longer of any importance, because it is out of keeping with the situation as a whole. Nietzsche was equally little interested in the "cob-webbery" of theological debate; it was against the Christian *ethos* as a whole that his assault was directed. It is with Christian morality more than with Christian theology that modern atheism is at war—not, be it noted, for the sake of moral licence, but for the sake of what is genuinely felt to be a higher morality. Unless we understand this, and in some measure feel it, we shall fail to estimate rightly the formidable nature of the opposition with which Christianity has to contend in the modern world. What mankind is confronted with to-day, as Nietzsche made abundantly plain, is a choice, a *decision*—the most fundamental of all decisions that man can make.

It is against this background that the towering figure of Dostoevsky stands out in imposing greatness. He probed the depths of man's real situation in a way which compels the reopening of questions that have been closed by peremptory answers. He forestalled Nietzsche in the sense that he had already faced the same issue and given the opposite answer. As he himself says: "The dolts have ridiculed my obscurantism and the reactionary character of my faith. These fools could not even conceive so strong a denial as the one to

which I gave expression. The whole book is an answer to *that*. You might search Europe in vain for so powerful an expression of atheism. Thus it is not like a child that I believe in Christ and confess Him. My Hosanna has come forth from the crucible of doubt."

It is in that region of existential choice, in the lived experience of life as a dialogue with God, and not at the more superficial level of intellectual debate and logical argument that the answer to modern atheism must be given. Père de Lubac's awareness that the Christian answer to modern unbelief can only be an existential one, and that it must take account of the totality of human experience, gives to his treatment of the issues an unusual depth and power.

Worcester Park. J. H. Oldham.

The Suffering Servant in Deutero-Isaiah: an Historical and Critical Study. By Christopher R. North. Oxford University Press. 15s.

At the beginning of his book Professor North recalls the fact that the late Canon Driver abandoned his project of writing a commentary on Isaiah because he felt he could not hope to overtake the necessary reading on the subject of the Ebed Yahweh Songs. Professor North has actually accomplished this task, and has given to the learned world a treatise on the problem of the Servant such as has never been surpassed for comprehensiveness and thoroughness by any previous publication. Is it too much to hope that Professor North will go on and give us the commentary on Isaiah towards which he has done so much preliminary work? As it is, we have in the volume which is the subject of this review an achievement of which British biblical scholarship may well be proud. The book is not an easy one to read. It contains a very thorough study of the Hebrew text and an amazingly detailed analysis of the innumerable theories regarding the identity of the Servant which have been put forward by a multitude of scholars.

For Jewish views on the subject Professor North has contented himself with using the great mass of material collected by Driver and Neubauer, but in the case of Christian interpretations from the eighteenth century onwards hardly any book or pamphlet or essay of importance seems to have escaped his personal perusal. The bibliography provides overwhelming proof of his industry, and inspires confidence in his judgment.

In Chapters IV-VI the three modern periods of interpretation are dealt with, successively inaugurated, as they were, by the epoch-making work of Döderlein, Duhm, and Mowinckel respectively. In all three periods there have been advocates of the collective, the historical-individual, and the Messianic interpretations, but in the second period Kittel suggested that the Servant was an anonymous contemporary of the Prophet who was thought of by him as a potential Messiah, a view which was elaborated by Rudolph in the

third period. In the third period the autobiographical theory, advocated so powerfully by Mowinckel in his publication of 1921, but subsequently abandoned by him, received a new lease of life in the work of Elliger and the veteran scholar Sellin, who had already put forward three distinct solutions. In this same third period the collective view, which numbers among its adherents men like Driver, Davidson, Peake, and Skinner, received notable reinforcement from what has come to be known as the "corporate personality" theory ably argued for by the late Principal Wheeler Robinson and by Professor Eissfeldt. A formula seemed to have been found which explained the apparent contradictions in the way in which the Servant was described.

It was, however, while the former was expounding his view in public that one of his hearers, the author of the book under review, became convinced that the collective theory, which had up till then held his allegiance, was not adequate to explain the facts. Step by step he felt himself forced to a restatement of the Messianic interpretation, not the older orthodox theory of mechanical and photographically exact precision, but a theory which sees the Messianic hope arising out of the circumstances in which the great Prophet of the exile found himself and looks forward to the definite coming of One who would be all that Cyrus had failed to be.

Professor North recognizes a predecessor in Gressmann in spite of the speculative character of the latter's work. Like him, he believes that the Second Isaiah was responsible for the creation of the concept of a suffering Messiah, but he holds that this is quite distinct from the Davidic Messiah of earlier and later expectation. Engnell, however, has recently sought to connect the concepts of the King-Messiah and the suffering Messiah by the theory that the Tammuz-Adonis Myth had had an influence in the Temple ritual in which the king was presented as a sufferer. Professor W. Manson, in his book *Jesus the Messiah*, has underlined the importance of "the afflictions of David." It is possible that Professor North has drawn too sharp a distinction between the two Messianic figures. They certainly show a tendency to merge into one. It remains true, however, that by the time of Christ the concepts were separate, and it seems to have been our Lord alone who perceived the truly Messianic character of the Servant.

But, while we must reckon Professor North as an advocate of the Messianic interpretation, it must be emphasized that, as he admits himself, there is a relative truth both in the autobiographical and in the collective interpretation. Indeed, we may also put in a word for the historical-individual interpretation in some at least of its forms. For it can scarcely be denied that, while Professor North is probably right in regarding the Servant as the coming Messiah, it was only in Israel that such a hope could have arisen. Not only in the great men of the past from Moses onwards, but in the life of humble folk such as those among whom the prophet lived, and in his own heart there were foreshadowings of what in its perfection was not yet. The very newness of the conception must not blind us to the wonderfully

fertile quality of the soil out of which it sprang. The Messiah is both a contrast to, and a fulfilment of, Israel.

University of Edinburgh. Norman W. Porteous.

Theologie und Geschichte des Judenchristentums. By Hans Joachim Schoeps. Tübingen. DM. 27.

Professor Schoeps of Erlangen stands in the "comprehensive" tradition of German scholarship. By harvesting the relevant studies of a century, he aims in this book at establishing an almost revolutionary understanding of the significance, both historical and theological, of Jewish Christianity, by which he means that of those Jewish Christians who left Jerusalem shortly before 70 A.D., and who are usually known synonymously to the Fathers as Ebionites and Nazarenes. The fruit of years of labour, this volume, in its scope, thoroughness, and challenging conclusions, is of major importance.

The now customary suspicion of the Tübingen School, which has led to the comparative neglect of Jewish Christianity, has been justified, because that school attempted a reconstruction of early Christianity before it had sifted its sources. Especially did it antedate the *Pseudo-Clementines*, and thus transferred to the first century conflicts that, in their developed form, belonged only to the second. Nevertheless, Baur's insight into the significance of the *Pseudo-Clementines* is valuable, and, now that the sources have been considerably examined, we can benefit by that insight without being uncritically dominated by it. From this point of view, Schoeps first surveys his sources. The evidence of the Fathers is marred by their confusion of Ebionites with "gnostic" groups; from Rabbinic documents little is gained. Of specifically Ebionite sources there are the Nazarene (N.E.) and the Ebionite (E.E.) Gospels, surviving in fragments in the Fathers and in *The Preaching of Peter* respectively, and the fragmentary Egyptian Ebionite Gospel with which Schoeps is not concerned. It is on Symmachus' Ebionite translations of the Old Testament and on the Ebionite material embedded in the fourth-century *Pseudo-Clementines* that he chiefly relies. Behind the latter stands a common source, *The Travels of Peter* (G.), which is quoted by Origen about 220 A.D. and draws upon ealier sources, and particularly on the *Κηρύγματα Πέτρου* (*K.Π.*). This last is dated about 160 A.D. (and in parts about 80 A.D.), and according to Schoeps it draws upon an Ebionite *Acta Apostolorum* to which he devotes an appendix of seventy-six pages. In reconstructing *K.Π.* Schoeps follows Waitz, but includes more material. He regards *K.Π.* as a pure Ebionite document presupposing a long history of Jewish Christianity and constituting our primary source for it. The *Syriac Didaskalia* he treats as very secondary.

Next, in Chapter II, very largely on the basis of *K.Π.*, Schoeps expounds the Christology of Jewish Christianity, its adoptionism, its emphasis on the categories of the Son of Man, the Prophet (Deut. xviii, 15), (the true prophets were not the canonical ones but the

"seven pillars of the world," Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and, finally, Jesus), and the New Moses. The New Moses had a positive attitude to the Law, and in Chapter III, again almost entirely on the basis of *K.Π.*, Schoeps describes the Ebionite attitude to the Law, one "more interesting and productive" than that of either the Great Church or Marcion. Jesus was the reformer of the Law. Those parts of it which He annulled did not belong to the true Law. They were falsifications introduced after Sinai: such were the laws on sacrifice, on kingship, and even on the prophets. Through these falsifications the will of God was forgotten: it agrees with this that Symmachus in his translations had to remove offensive elements. But the New Moses not merely enabled Ebionites to separate the precious from the vile in the Old Testament: He also intensified the demand of the true Law, hence the vegetarianism and ascetic poverty of Ebionitism, its radical emphasis on the laws of clean and unclean, and on baptism, which replaced the sacrificial fires. In Chapter IV the roots of these Ebionite factors are traced to a Rechabite and Essene source, and in Chapter V the history of Jewish Christianity—its rise and fall, organization and practice—is sketched.

From all this Jewish Christianity emerges as far more significant than has hitherto been recognized. In the past, it has suggested not so much communities as individuals, sects or schools of thought. But Schoeps describes a numerous far-spread community enjoying "monarchical episcopacy," with a system of organized teaching. Previously it has appeared to most after 70 A.D. as "an unimportant survival" (Burkitt), a syncretistic admixture of Judaism, Christianity, and Gnosticism. But Schoeps ascribes to it the heritage of the primitive community of Jerusalem: it is no gnostic mush, but the subtle champion of the Old Testament against Marcion. The decline of Jewish Christianity implies nothing about its real significance.

The importance of Schoeps' thesis will be clear. Moreover, its detailed argument affords constant illumination (punctured by dissent—*e.g.*, concerning Stephen, M. Sanhedrin x, 1, etc.). Particularly satisfying are the interpretation (without the Tübingen excesses) of the first century in the light of the second and *vice versa*; the treatment of the interactions of Rabbinic Judaism and Jewish Christianity and of Symmachus' translations. But Schoeps rests his case upon the existence and character of *K.Π.*, which he testily disentangles from the *Pseudo-Clementines*, and from this two difficulties arise. First, the very existence of *K.Π.*, Schoeps' foundation document, and the validity of all the source criticism of the *Pseudo-Clementines* has been questioned. In a field largely neglected by British students the present reviewer cannot pass judgment; but Schoeps can claim that the weight of critical orthodoxy is on his side, and in view of this, although the *Anhang: Epiphanius und Pseudoklemens,* in which he seeks to prove that his case is not unsupported by sources outside the *K.Π.*, is not in itself convincing (especially p. 463), his use of *K.Π.* seems legitimate. But, secondly, there remains not only its exact delineation but also its interpretation. Is *K.Π.* an anti-gnostic

document aimed at counteracting Marcionism? It is unlikely. The "gnostic" elements in *K.Π.* can hardly be explained away as parallels to the treatment of the Oral Law in Judaism, although that was sometimes termed a "mystery." We should not assume that the "interdict" on the writing of the Oral Law was due to its "secret" or "esoteric" character (such secrecy belonged rather to the *ma'aseh berêshîth* and *ma'aseh merkâbâh*); it was the unity and otherness of Israel and the centrality of the written Law that was thereby served. While he recognizes in passing that Hellenistic concepts were being Judaized in the first century, Schoeps does not sufficiently realize, perhaps, how Jewish Christianity, whose missionary tendencies he champions, even more so than Judaism itself, was geographically and otherwise open to Hellenistic influences, nor is it likely that there was in Jewish Christianity such a recoil after 70 A.D. against these as was the case in Judaism. In short, Schoeps has built a fascinating structure, but we are uneasy about the nature of its foundations: his book, however, remains an important and strikingly original challenge.

W. D. Davies.

Bradford.

The Teaching of the Catholic Church. A Summary of Catholic Doctrine arranged and edited by Canon George D. Smith. Burns Oates and Washbourne. Two vols. 50s.

This massive work, comprising over thirteen hundred pages and presented "as a reliable encyclopædia of doctrine," is a reprint of thirty-five volumes in the "Treasury of Faith" Series which first appeared a generation ago. The contributors, who here reappear with their youthful designations unaltered, include writers who have since earned a reputation outside their own communion; notably J. P. Arendzen, M. C. D'Arcy, C. C. Martindale, Archbishop Downey, the late Archbishop Goodier, and Abbot Vonier. But they here write for their own flocks and in a manner which is not calculated to attract many of their fellow-Christians of other persuasions.

The plan of the work is familiar to those who have handled Tanquerey and similar summaries. Groups of essays are allotted to the doctrines of the Trinity, Creation, Angels, the Fall and Redemption, "Mary, the Mother of God," the Church and the sacramental system, and the Hereafter. The various articles of faith appear to be presented as equally binding on "Catholics," regardless of inclusion in the Apostles' Creed. In support, an imposing catena of quotations is collected in each case from Scripture, the Fathers, and Vatican documents. The result is a close-knit, solid, shut structure which may command respect even where it fails to find agreement.

It would be a tedious exercise in higher criticism to discover how far the editor has revised his original monographs. In their present form the essays remain dated as well by their statements as by omissions. For example, there is very little effort to relate what is written to the authors' contemporary world; and apart from a remark

attributed to the Duke of Wellington, a couplet from Browning, a tag from Byron, a peremptory footnote on Harnack, a passing reference to a book published in the twenties by an Anglican "liberal," Dr Major, we miss points of contact with any non-Roman circles. Allusion is made to the Great War as a legacy of the teachings of Nietzsche, but this would have gained in force if it had been extended to include the second, Hitler's, combat. Again, the rapid strides in dynamic thinking which have been made both inside and outside the Roman milieu since the chapters were composed leave these studies unaffected. Anglicans who have more recently developed a regard for the continental liturgical movement, for the motifs of church-mysticism associated with Emile Mersch, for the now widely spread social theories of modern Thomists, will have to look elsewhere for enlightenment. Nor is there a hint of the mutual forbearance which discussions between denominations have lately engendered. It is left to the discerning reader to inquire how much would have been modified in these essays if they had been written after the totalitarian menace and the clash with Communism had begun.

GORING-BY-SEA. W. W. S. MARCH.

CANTERBURY CATHEDRAL IN THE MIDDLE AGES. By C. S. Phillips. S.P.C.K. 2s. 6d.

This book made its appearance only a very little while after the death of Dr Phillips. On its opening page is a dedication to "W. P. B.," Mr Blore the late librarian, *amicus amico*. The thirty-eight pages are a kind of parting message from these two friends.

The few pages are packed close with industriously collected information—detailed, verified, documented; but what will secure most attention is the "Burnt Breviary." Through this, and a hundred and one other subjects, Dr Phillips will win sympathetic attention to the life of Canterbury in the past.

It happened to the reviewer once, as he came away from one of our very great cathedrals, to be frontally attacked by an American visitor with the question: could I tell him why these old monks had thought it worth their while to build all this? A reproachful daughter remonstrated with her American father: "Oh, Pop!" But the question does ask itself, and is scarcely answered except by the cathedral itself. It takes time to see what It is. And it is because It is what It is that It is there.

And this work of Dr Phillips would help to explain. For he has long lived very close to such knowledge as we can have of those Middle Ages. In his pages you are made aware of what monks were doing. You could almost do it with them. He makes it out, detail by detail, for example, from that Burnt Breviary—written in A.D. 1373, 1383 (?) and added to, burned in the Audit House 1670, and reconstructed from fragments, now, with a fine indefatigable care and wide learning. He brings it out for us, out of the relics. He has imagined it to life again from each unburned word (or, sometimes, one or two unburned letters of a word).

A cathedral (you see) may be, to a visitor, like some seashell on the sand, beautiful and lifeless—its old life gone! There is need of a special kind of sympathetic study to revive, for a modern soul, that monastic life, so that we may realize that it is, in any sense, continuous with ours.

In no circumstances could the life of 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 1500 be alive *unaltered* to-day, in 18 or 19 or 2000. Yet life to-day will be better alive if it can be in living touch with our past. And the life in Canterbury Cathedral will be the more alive where such spirits are found as those of the nonagenarian, Mr C. E. Woodruff, and Dr Phillips, and the Librarian, William Blore. Of course no one but an expert could begin to "review" this expert work, but the reviewer may be permitted to recall a day in 1939 when the library treasures were to be removed from their home, in haste; to escape, in fact, a (smaller) bomb of 1941. They were to go down into a hiding place which had unintentionally been made ready for them in 1180. There was no sign that the place had been entered in those seven or eight hundred years, if you except one dried up dead cat. In the removal, help was pressed upon Mr Blore, of soldiers of the Buffs, of boys of the King's School, of musicians and clergy, and others. But Mr Blore was fastidious. He was unwilling to trust the books and MSS and seals and silks to any hands but his own. The only hands to which he trusted them without an ill-concealed anxiety were those of Dr Phillips. The Burnt Breviary was, no doubt, among them. A two-ton bomb fell near enough to the hiding place, after missing bell Harry by a matter of feet. Yet our treasures are safe, and here is Dr Phillips, in his little book, helping us to recapture—and to continue—the sense of the life long ago of the still living cathedral which he so loyally loved and served.

J. M. C. Crum.

Farnham.

The Banquet. By Walter Roberts. Staples Press. 7s. 6d.

Mr Walter Roberts writes in an unfashionable manner, and a first glance at this, and also at both the blurb and Professor Ifor Evans's not very useful foreword, may mislead the reader into thinking that here is pleasant, untopical verse, written with more pains than passion. But at the heart of Mr Roberts's work there is, in fact, a passionate protest against present-day society. Like Ezra Pound, he hates USURA that "slayeth the child in the womb," and he hates also the mechanistic, stillborn society which is all the politicans seem to be able to set against it:

> Must we destroy by inches all our gifts,
> Grind God to powder in the graveyard shifts,
> Crucify Man to earn our daily bread
> And change all gold into the dullest lead?

That quotation comes from the title poem, which is not really successful because Mr Roberts does not handle very well the debate-

cum-prizefight form in which his satire is expressed, nor does he manage to make Wales a convincing symbol for the society which needs, and is capable of, rebirth. Nevertheless, it does go to the centre of the poet's creed, and shows that his preoccupation with quiet and sometimes old-fashioned themes is a deliberate choice, not just a sentimental relaxation. And the choice is based not only on a disgust with modern civilization, but on a real confidence in the true potentialities of man.

It is when he is at his least argumentative, however, that he is at his best, as in the poems about Christopher Wood, and about a village photographer. In these he returns less, perhaps, to an eighteenth-century method than to the method of *Don Juan*, though without Byron's sparkle, and with a slacker rhythm which reminds one at times of Edmund Blunden or Edward Thomas:

> His workmanship is all about us still;
> His whole-plate groups and scenes, his cabinet
> And carte-de-visite portraits, always will
> Hold our attention. If we should forget
> A distant cousin's or an old friend's face,
> There is witness on the mantelpiece
> That this is how they looked; there is a place
> Where Bishop still recalls our favourite niece.
> A wandering remembrancer of things,
> A stay-at-home fruit-bottler of ripe days,
> He did his best to give us angels' wings
> And fairy coaches. In that early haze
> When Lewis Carroll made his Alice smile,
> Bishop created, and maintained, a style.

Mr Roberts's wit is the most effective when he is casual rather than epigrammatic, and he uses, at times, rather rusty words and fails to screw them tight enough to his meaning; but he is writing in a valuable tradition and one that (to the hurt of poetry) is neglected to-day. To revive it requires not only that poets should practise writing it but that readers should practise reading it, for which reason—as well as for the pleasure the poems have given me—I recommend this book to all who are not tacked down by fashion or by habit.

NORMAN NICHOLSON.

MILLOM,
CUMBERLAND.

SHORTER NOTICES

WITH HIM IN HIS TEMPTATIONS. By Constance E. Padwick. Sheldon Press. 4s.

This is the kind of Christian apologetic of which we need more. Its primary purpose is to assist the ordinary Christian in giving an answer for his faith to the questions and objections of unbelief. It is actually written to meet the kind of attacks occurring in Moslem anti-Christian propaganda. But the great majority of the issues are

recognizable at once as the same that raise their head wherever faith encounters disbelief—the divinity of Christ, the historicity of the Gospels, science and miracles, the need for atonement, the fact of the Resurrection, "Did Christ really live?", "Why did He do nothing about social reform?", "He gave His people a sermon, but not a sacrament," and so on. Here all these questions and many others are invariably dealt with with sound theology, profound simplicity, and telling illustration. The treatment seldom fails to be suggestive, and many of the explanations—*e.g.*, of the cursing of the barren fig-tree —are convincingly illuminated by close familiarity with the background of the Middle East.

But the real contribution of this book lies in the fact that it is much more than another magazine of small arms ammunition. Its attitude to the enemy is informed not by polemic but by a recurring expression of gratitude and intercession. In all these challenges the Christian is seen as being led by the Spirit to deepen his union with the living Christ. For to meet these attacks is part of what is meant for the members of Christ's Body to continue with Him in His temptations. All the suggestions of the Devil are set and faced within the context of the victory in the Wilderness.

It is hard to think of a book that could be more confidently recommended for general Lent reading. It unites in rare combination hard thinking (constantly falling over into devotion) with a practical aim and a missionary setting. Indeed, the S.P.C.K. might well consider its republication another year as a Lent book—and in a format that is less likely to make the casual observer mistake it for just another set of Sunday School lessons.

John A. T. Robinson.

Wells Theological College.

On Prayer. By J. P. De Caussade, S.J. Burns Oates. 12s. 6d.

This is a book of the purest gold. Published in 1741, it constitutes a summary, based on direct quotations, and in pleasingly convincing dialogue form, of Bossuet's work against the Quietists, his *Instruction sur les divers états d'Oraison*. It is in two books: the first dealing mainly with the false claims of Quietism with regard to contemplation, setting down the teaching of various Catholic mystics on the points in dispute; the second treating in detail of the different degrees of recollection and states of contemplation, in particular the prayer of quiet, with the necessary conditions of its attainment and practice.

De Caussade is one of those writers one must either put down or submit to. One does not merely read him. Taking as his model our Lady's entire response to the angelic salutation, it was the favourite doctrine of his spiritual letters that God conveys and reveals Himself through the minutest details of our circumstances as really as He does through the consecrated Elements, and that our whole perfection lies in responding from moment to moment to the impressions

of His grace as it meets us in these circumstances, in particular the circumstances of passive prayer, in which these impressions are strongest, and in which the self-abandonment of the soul attains its high point of intensity.

"Incarnation," Chesterton wrote, "always leads to crucifixion"; but it is exactly our willingness to be irrevocably involved in the pain of the world's ordering which enables its redemption. "Prayer," said De Caussade, "is the centre of religion"; for it is in prayer that the eye of faith is kept bright to sense God in circumstance, and the soul made supple and strong to respond with redeeming submission.

There is an admirable introduction by Dom John Chapman.

STOCKPORT. J. K. BYROM.

FLAME TOUCHES FLAME. By Margaret Cropper. Longmans. 10s. 6d.

One must be grateful to the author of this book for the love and labour she has bestowed on the six saints of her choice. In order of treatment they are George Herbert, Nicholas Ferrar, Henry Vaughan, Jeremy Taylor, Margaret Godolphin, and Thomas Ken. "Particulars," says Herbert, in his remarks on preaching, "ever touch and awake more than generals"; and it may be that studies of particular lights and stars such as these will more effectively kindle lay interest in the treasures of Caroline theology than more general, though not inferior, essays on the spirit or genius of that formidable entity, Anglicanism.

There is a sense of history running through the book, a sense of the slow, mysterious unexpectedness of time's unwinding, and by the author's sense of the real interaction of the natural and supernatural we are spared that unsatisfying feeling that her heroes' destinies were a foregone conclusion. In their dependence, also, on one another's writings, which is brought out, we have a classic instance of what Herbert calls that "traffic in knowledge between the servants of God, for the planting of love and humility." They had each "put on the profound humility and exact temperance of Jesus." In Taylor's borrowed phrase, they were "patics in devotion."

STOCKPORT. J. K. BYROM.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF DANIEL LINDLEY. By Edwin W. Smith. Epworth Press. 21s.

This book tells us much more about the times of Daniel Lindley than about his life. It is therefore very readable. For there is little that is notable about his life, whereas his times in South Africa were those of the Great Trek and the early settlement of Natal. Mr Smith has written a clear and exciting account of those days. Lindley makes an occasional fleeting appearance, but he seldom intrudes long enough to divert our attention from the main story.

Lindley was an American and a Presbyterian. At the age of thirty-

four he was sent by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to work among the Zulus in South Africa. One would like to learn something of his missionary methods. He found the Zulus unreceptive; he went doggedly on; he built houses and schools; such things we learn; but what his methods were, how he set about preaching and evangelizing, of such matters we are told nothing.

However, you must not read this book with the expectation of adding another figure to the list of great missionaries. It gives a picture of a humdrum figure in stirring times. Those who find it difficult to understand the present hostility of Africaners (*i.e.*, those who were once called Boers or Dutch) to South Africa's attachment to the British Empire will find the reasons set forth here without partiality. The Boers have never willingly submitted to British rule. In 1836 the Great Trek began in order to get away from it. The Boers faced great hazards and endured great hardship in order to be free of it. They found Natal, a country which seemed the promised land, with its fertile soil and its abundant water. When the British came into Natal from the sea and took over the government of it, such was the independence of the Boers that most of them preferred to uproot themselves again. Back they went over the barrier of the Drakensberg Range and settled in the Transvaal. Before long the British annexed that, too.

The times of Daniel Lindley have a relevance for the understanding of the South Africa of to-day in another respect. For the Africaner's native policy has roots in the early nineteenth century. Living with the natives all round them meant living in jeopardy of their lives. Their survival as a race was threatened. Unsuccessful English colonists might return to England, but the Boers had no such refuge; South Africa was their country, and the native was a rival claimant to the same country. Their native policy has its roots in their history, their sufferings, their achievements. We may dislike it, but intelligent criticism of it must start from an attempt to understand it. This book will enable the reader to begin to understand it.

F. C. Synge.

Grahamstown.

St Paul's Gospel to the Romans. By G. O. Griffith. Blackwell. 10s. 6d.

"Paul, as a child of his age, addressed his contemporaries. It is, however, far more important that, as Prophet and Apostle of the Kingdom of God, he veritably speaks to all men of every age" (Barth). But how shall we hear without a commentator?

Mr Griffith has written an exposition of the Epistle to the Romans which both illuminates its themes and, not unlike Temple in his meditations on St John, ventures to suggest their bearing upon ourselves. While, therefore, the book does allude—and alludes with authority, though Mr Griffith is not one to parade his learning—to

certain difficult questions of textual integrity, essentially it is exposition of a high order which can be warmly commended to all who preach. Not unexpectedly, for Mr Griffith is a disciple of Forsyth, Chapter VIII is treated as the keystone of the whole argument (Christ, through whom the worlds were made, is concerned with the redemption of the universe and not only with a section of mankind called the Church), although the doctrines of Predestination and Sanctification are not so explicitly linked to it in the exposition as they obviously are in Mr Griffith's thought. Perhaps the best chapter in this notable book is the paraphrase of the epistle, of which this is a sample: (xiv 14 ff.) "Myself, I know—I am certain in the Lord Jesus—that there is no kind of food that in itself is 'unclean.' All the same, if a man, because of a religious scruple, regards this or that as unclean, then unclean for him it certainly is. If, therefore, your Christian brother is pained because of your eating certain foods, then you are not following the way of love if you disregard his feelings. And what if he should be so scandalized as to be estranged from the faith? Beware, then, lest by the food you eat you ruin a man for whom Christ died! Don't let your freedom, good as it is, become an occasion of disputation and recrimination. For, after all, we know very well that the Kingdom of God is not an affair of eating and drinking!"

WILFRID BROWNING.

HOVE.

WHY COMMUNISM?—AND WHY NOT? By A. E. Baker. I.C.F. 1s.
CHRISTIANITY AND MARXISM. By Mervyn Stockwood. S.P.C.K. 2s.

There is a great deal of information contained in these booklets at a low price. Church people generally do not understand Communism, or they underrate its challenge and feel complacent about it, but the last few pages of both books bring home to Christians their responsibility for trying to eradicate the evils against which Communists have been and are striving. To do this the second book shows that the Church must actively interfere with the world. Manpower and organization must be adapted to present conditions and the Church must prove its concern for social justice.

Both of them outline the Communist case and method with a certain amount of criticism. Canon Baker deals with the curse of poverty, which Communists say is the fruit of capitalism, the Marxist conception of economics, history, and economic determinism. The contribution of Marx is noted, and also Berdyaev's dictum that he was greater as a sociologist than as an exponent of human nature (p. 16). The relation of Communism to science, morals, personality, and religion is outlined, and then the Christian position is set out, stressing the need for an accurate picture of the whole and the urgent issues facing Christians in a world where only a "dangerously irresponsible person" would venture to say that half the population gets enough food to keep reasonably healthy (p. 33).

The second book goes more fully into several points—*e.g.*, the meaning of Communism and the need of accurate use of terms; an exposition of dialectical materialism and of economic determinism is given. If these provide the Communist criteria for historical judgments the Christian must ask, is his criterion that of faith? The Marxist says that "all recorded history is the history of class struggle" (p. 18), and economic conditions provide the key to all spheres of life including religion. Yet the class system and the dialectical interpretation explain only some of life's phenomena and historical facts, and incorrectly assume that economic change will alter human behaviour fundamentally.

Christians, however, cannot attack Communist methods with absolutely clean hands, for they have used, and perhaps are using, similar means. Despite its methods which are sketched (pp. 34-44), Communism "is a noble ideal" (p. 44) and the ideal and the methods should be separated (cf. pp. 9-10). Some references to authorities might have helped readers—*e.g.*, that a million farmers were sent to Siberia (p. 39). The book emphasizes that action to-day, as has happened often before, should flow from theological conviction, not political necessity. Christianity is more accurate than Marxism in its estimate both of human selfishness and of divine grace.

NEWTOWNARDS, N. IRELAND. H. F. WOODHOUSE.

THE CHURCH: REPORT OF THE SIXTH ANGLO-CATHOLIC CONGRESS. Dacre Press. 12s. 6d.

This handsomely produced volume contains the papers that were read at the sessions of the Anglo-Catholic Congress in July, 1948. The subject was treated under four heads: "The Bible," "The Creeds," "The Ministry," and "The Sacraments," and four papers were devoted to each of these topics. Most of the papers were too brief to develop much in the way of an argument. In any case their purpose does not appear to have been polemical, but to give elementary and straightforward instruction. Only those who heard all the papers could say which made the profoundest impression when spoken. They were not all equally deserving of publication. The papers by Professor Ramsey, Professor Mackinnon, and Dr Mascall are especially worth reading.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

ABINGDON-COKESBURY PRESS, NASHVILLE, TENN.: *The Private Devotions of Lancelot Andrewes* (translated and arranged by J. H. Newman) ($1.25).
A.P.R.: *The General List of Retreats for* 1950 (9d.).
BLACKFRIARS: Gerald Vann, O.P., *The Pain of Christ* (Second Ed.) (5s.).

BURNS OATES: Hubert van Zeller, O.S.B., *Moments of Light* (7s. 6d.); Hubert van Zeller, O.S.B., *Famine of the Spirit* (7s. 6d.); T. F. Lindsay, *Saint Benedict* (10s. 6d.); E. J. Mahoney, *Questions and Answers. II, Precepts* (18s.); Omer Englebert, *Saint Francis of Assisi* (16s.); A. A. King, *The Rites of Eastern Christendom* (63s.).

CATHOLIC TRUTH SOCIETY: Henry Newsholme, *The Population Report and the Survival of the Christian Family* (6d.).

CLONMORE AND REYNOLDS: Arthur H. Ryan, *The Church of Christ* (8s. 6d.); I. M. Kingsbury, *The Miracle of the Mountains: A Simple Record of Fatima* (4s. 6d.).

CORK UNIVERSITY PRESS: Alfred O'Rahilly, *The Family at Bethany* (12s. 6d.).

DACRE PRESS: E. L. Mascall (Ed.), *The Mother of God* (6s.); V. A. Demant, *What is Happening to Us?* (2s. 6d.).

EDITIONS DU SEUIL (PARIS): Jean Abd-El-Jalil, *Aspects intérieurs de l'Islam* (n.p.).

GROSVENOR PRESS (BLACKFRIARS ROAD, PORTSMOUTH): T. Grigg-Smith, *Intinction and the Administration of the Chalice* (4s.).

HAMMOND, HAMMOND AND CO.: H. Westmann (Ed.), *Man and Freedom?* (2s. 6d.).

HUTCHINSON: W. R. Inge, *Diary of a Dean* (21s.).

INDEPENDENT PRESS: Henry David Gray, *The Christian Doctrine of Grace* (8s. 6d.); A. J. B. Higgins, *The Christian Significance of the Old Testament* (8s. 6d.).

KAISER VERLAG (MUNICH): Paul Schempp, *Der Anruf Gottes* (4.80 DM.).

LONGMANS: J. E. Fison, *The Blessing of the Holy Spirit* (8s. 6d. and 5s. 6d.); Roger Lloyd, *The Church of England in the Twentieth Century*, Vol. II (1919-1939) (18s. 6d.); Hubert C. Libbey, *The Eight Deadlier Sins* (4s. and 2s. 6d.).

LUTTERWORTH PRESS: D. T. Niles, *For To-day* (8s. 6d.); Hans Lietzmann, *The Founding of the Church Universal* (21s.).

MOWBRAY: Education Committee of the Oxford Diocesan Council for Moral Welfare, *A Short Guide to Christian Sex Education* (1s. 6d.); G. le P. Hunt, *Present Day Verses* (1s. 6d.); Sir Stafford Cripps, *The Spiritual Crisis* (1s.).

FREDERICK MULLER: John W. Doorly, *God and Science* (10s. 6d.).

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION PRESS: Norman H. Snaith, *The Jews from Cyrus to Herod* (6s.).

ROCKCLIFF: Rosa Hobhouse, *Mary Hughes* (6s.).

S.C.M. PRESS: Emil Brunner, *Our Faith* (7s. 6d.); Basil Mathews, *Booker T. Washington* (18s.); C. E. B. Cranfield, *The First Epistle of Peter* (7s. 6d.); R. R. Williams, *Authority in the Apostolic Age* (8s. 6d.); Clifford M. Jones, *The Methods of Christian Education* (7s. 6d.).

S.C.M. PRESS and LUTTERWORTH PRESS: Hugh Martin, E. A. Payne, G. H. G. Hewitt (Ed.), *A Christian Year Book* 1950 (7s. 6d.).

SHEED AND WARD: Alfred Noyes, *The Unknown God* (New Edition) (8s. 6d.); Christopher Dawson, *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (15s.); Oscar Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (10s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K.: J. Woods, *The Old Testament in the Church* (9s. 6d.); E. H. Blakeney (Ed.), *Lactantius' Epitome of the Divine Institutes* (11s.); C. E. Douglas, *Church and City* (2s.); G. C. Binyon, *Christian Prayers in a Secular World* (9d.); Arthur F. Smethurst, *Convocation of Canterbury* (3s. 9d.).

S.P.C.K./N.S.: S. H. Evans and E. W. Southcott (Ed.), *Unto a Full-Grown Man: Vol. 7—Anglican Mission* (6s.).

TYNDALE PRESS: G. Ch. Aalders, *A Short Introduction to the Pentateuch* (6s.).

WATTS: A. D. Howell Smith, *Thou Art Peter* (21s.).

WOODCOMBE FARMHOUSE, MINEHEAD: S. P. T. Prideaux, *Ad Clerum or Self-Examination Questions on the Ten Commandments* (1s. 3d.).

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